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 AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS 
INFLUENCING THE ENACTMENT OF BANKING 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION:  EVIDENCE 
FROM FIFTY YEARS OF BANKING LAWS AND 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REGULATION 
WILLIAM C. HANDORF, REGGIE O’SHIELDS, AND ANDREW RICHARDSON* 
 
The enactment of new banking laws in the United States is 
cyclical.  When the unemployment rate balloons and the economy 
contracts, more banks fail.  In response to surging bank failures, loss of 
confidence in the banking system, and escalating public costs for the 
federal government to bailout the system, Congress conducts hearings 
and passes more restrictive laws.  Such legislation attempts to reduce the 
likelihood of future bank failures, and often creates new regulatory 
organizations to carry out the mandate.  With the passage of time, 
regulatory agencies provide bankers guidance in the form of regulation.  
Safety and soundness regulatory guidance varies with the economy, the 
number of bank failures, and the party affiliation of the President and 
Congress.  Administrative guidance varies little with economic, industry, 
or political factors.  Regulatory compliance rules increase with the 
passage of a new banking law and with inflation given that many 
historical laws (e.g., civil money penalties) require that monetary 
thresholds adjust according to revised price levels.  There is no 
discernable trend or evidence suggesting that either banking laws or their 
accompanying regulations have been issued more frequently over the 
period assessed.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Given the importance of access to credit by consumers and 
businesses and recognition of the substantial public costs that can be and 
are incurred when insured institutions periodically fail in predictable and 
preventable situations, banks are a special sector in commerce.  
Consequently, banks are subject to extensive supervision and regulation 
resulting from legislation enacted by Congress.  The justification for 
wide-ranging regulatory supervision reflects several different rationales, 
including: (1) issuance of charters by federal or state government; (2) 
access to the central bank’s discount window; (3) deposit insurance 
coverage; (4) control of systemic risk; and (5) commitment to social and 
community needs.  The latter four rationales reflect legislation enacted 
over the past century.1 
This Article reviews key banking laws enacted in the United 
States during the past half-century and focuses on resulting regulatory 
trends over the previous twenty-five years.  We address a number of 
related questions.  How has banking legislation, supervision, and 
regulation evolved and what external factors, if any, precipitate change?  
Does legislation and resulting regulation primarily respond to periods of 
increasing bank failure or do other economic, political, and social 
problems provide a policy catalyst?  Do evolving regulations primarily 
reflect safety and soundness, compliance, or administrative matters?  Are 
regulatory pronouncements increasing, decreasing, or exhibiting little in 
the way of a trend over the decades studied?  
This Article examines the antecedents of the passage of banking 
law and subsequent promulgation of accompanying regulation.  Part II 
provides general background material on the regulation of the banking 
industry.2  Part III examines historical bank failures and subsequent 
legislative responses, highlighting the cyclical nature of financial 
regulation and the economy.3  Part IV examines the correlation between 
bank failures and economic distress.4  Part V discusses recent bank 
 
 1. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat 873 (1950); 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977); Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2. See infra Part II 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
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legislation.5  Part VI reviews recent bank regulation.6  We conclude in 
Part VII by highlighting the issues that impact the passage of banking law 
and the promulgation of accompanying regulation.7 
II.  GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION 
We have categorized banking law and regulation into three 
general categories: safety and soundness, compliance, and 
administrative.  Safety and soundness regulation is designed to protect 
against systemic risk and ensure banks retain sufficient capital and 
liquidity to remain viable and able to meet the financial needs of 
communities and the nation.8  Regulation focuses not only on capital and 
liquidity, but also on asset quality, earnings, sensitivity, management, 
risk management, and incentive compensation among many other related 
areas.  Compliance regulation is enacted to ensure banks meet the 
legitimate financial needs of the respective regions they serve and 
requires institutions to provide full disclosure to, and the fair and non-
discriminatory treatment of, all customers.9  Administrative regulation 
includes rules of practice and procedure, bank governance provisions, 
assessment and deposit insurance requirements, and freedom of 
information issues, among other rules.  Regulation must balance the 
threat of monopoly or oligopoly within a market, as banks are allowed to 
expand in size by merger and acquisition, and add new related services 
that may promote economies of scale and scope.  
Financial regulators exercise their supervisory authority on a 
number of levels.  At the top of that hierarchy are federal statutes, which 
provide the legislative authority for the relevant regulatory agency to act, 
consistent with the constitutional concept of separation of powers since 
regulatory agencies are placed within the executive branch of 
government.  Ultimately, all regulatory action, including rulemaking and 
other regulatory processes, must be traced back to federal legislation and 
 
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. See infra Part VI. 
 7. See infra Part VII. 
 8. Examples of safety and soundness regulations include enhanced liquidity, capital and 
other prudential regulations issued under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 9. Examples of compliance regulations include standards issued under the Community 
Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977). 
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must be consistent with that legislation.  To the extent the legislation has 
delegated rulemaking authority to a regulatory agency, as frequently 
occurs as the statute becomes more complex, courts typically give 
deference to such agency action unless Congress has been clear in the 
statute as to its intent.10  Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”),11 rulemakings or regulations, which have general applicability 
and the force of law, must typically be issued through a defined process 
that involves public notice and comment.12  In 2018, federal banking 
regulators reiterated the long-standing legal principles that supervisory 
guidance does not have the force and effect of law and that regulators do 
not take enforcement actions based on supervisory guidance.  Rather, 
guidance articulates supervisory expectations and priorities.13  
Existing research has not evaluated how banking law and 
subsequent regulatory releases have evolved in relation to the health of 
the industry, the political environment, and the economy.  Are there 
regulatory patterns that can be categorized, classified, differentiated or 
arranged in any meaningful hierarchical series?  As initially 
hypothesized, bank failures feature prominently in the enactment of 
banking laws and the subsequent promulgation of regulations.  
Many financial, organizational, economic, and legal studies 
assess the favorable and unfavorable impact of regulation and law once 
enacted.  For example, when rules required banks to increase equity 
capital, studies demonstrated that return on assets increases, the leverage 
multiplier declined, and the return on equity tended to decline below the 
rate required by investors.14  Similarly, when large and internationally-
active banking organizations were subject to compliance with the 
restrictive Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“LCR”) and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (“NSFR”), research disclosed the adverse financial consequence.15  
The LCR was designed to ensure a bank retains sufficient liquid assets to 
 
 10. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 11. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 18-5/ CA 18-7, INTERAGENCY 
STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 12, 2018). 
 14. William C. Handorf, Capital Management and Bank Value, 12 J. BANKING REG., 
Sept. 2011, at 1–11. 
 15. William C. Handorf, The Cost of Bank Liquidity, 15 J. BANKING REG., Jan. 2014, at 
1–13 (empirically demonstrating that liquidity regulation encouraging banks to invest in more 
short-term, low-risk securities and to fund assets by more long-term, stable sources of debt 
imposes costs on banks that reduce their profits through lower net interest spread, but if bank 
liquidity is sufficient to withstand subsequent periods of market stress, also will reduce public 
expenditures associated with bank failure). 
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withstand a thirty-day runoff of liabilities.  The NSFR encouraged banks 
to rely more fully on long-term, stable sources of funding.  Given the 
existence of a liquidity premium embedded within the yield curve, both 
liquidity rules adversely impacted net interest income and profitability, 
as short-term investment securities typically earn less and long-term debt 
normally costs more.  The Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) has 
established a repository for the now very large number of articles 
demonstrating the impact of financial regulation.16  Its work shows that 
once a banking law is enacted or a regulation is released, the number of 
academic and professional references proliferates.   
Our investigation precedes such studies and assesses the cycles 
of the enactment of law, promulgation of regulation, and release of 
related supervisory measures.  Legislators and the administration 
invariably respond to economic contractions coupled with problems 
experienced by financial institutions.  Bank crises are not a new 
phenomenon.  A crisis can include a panic when the financial markets, 
the inter-bank market, and depositors lose confidence in the banking 
sector and withdraw funds, and a failure when many institutions are 
liquidated or merged by regulatory authority.  Crises occur in the U.S. 
and other countries approximately every generation.  U.S. banks have 
recovered ten years after the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting 
economic contraction.   
It is instructive to briefly review the long and frequent episodes 
of bank failure and market stress over the past century to provide a base 
for later legislative and regulatory analysis.  Bank failure is a key catalyst 
prompting Congress and the then existing administration to enact law and 
introduce new regulatory agencies and accompanying regulation.  The 
introduction of new agencies and programs subsequently broadens and 
deepens the reasons, or raison d’etre, banks are supervised.  Regulation 
is self-reinforcing.  
III.  HISTORICAL BANK FAILURE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
A former Comptroller of the Currency responsible for regulation 
and supervision of national banks indicated, “[t]he [bank] failures for the 
current year have been numerous, many having been characterized by 
 
 16. Frederic Boissay et al., Impact of Financial Regulations: Insights from an Online 
Repository of Studies, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2019, at 53–68, 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1903f.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE33-UK7A]. 
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gross mismanagement and some by criminality of an aggravated 
character. . ..”17  Although these words easily could have been written in 
the United States during any crisis, including the most recent financial 
crisis in 2008, they were penned in 1891 by then Comptroller Edward S. 
Lacey.18  The following chronicle notes how banking laws have 
responded to financial and banking crises over the past century and 
introduced new agencies responsible for carrying out the mandate.  The 
legislative responses have increased, broadened, and deepened the 
reasons banks are supervised.  
After winning the presidential election in 1912, Woodrow Wilson 
prioritized banking reform in response to the devastating banking crisis 
and severe recession of 1907.  The Federal Reserve Act of 191319 created 
the existing central bank.  Additional access to liquidity did not quell 
future panics, but provided further justification for the supervision of 
banks.20  
The Banking Act of 193321 established the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and authorized the new agency to 
provide limited federal deposit insurance as of 1934 following numerous 
bank failures and bank runs resulting from the Great Depression, the Dust 
Bowl, and the subsequent National Banking Holiday when deposit 
institutions were closed.22  The modest governmental deposit coverage 
did not stem subsequent losses from failure, but again expanded the 
rationale for why banks are regulated. 
The Federal Reserve shocked the markets in 1979 by dramatically 
increasing short-term interest rates to control rampant inflation.  Savings 
and loan (“S&L”) institutions suffered severe disintermediation as 
customers withdrew funds in favor of Treasury securities offering higher 
yields than financial institutions were then able to pay on deposit 
products.  Congress passed several laws, including the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198023 and the 
 
 17. JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 194 (Bradford 
Rhodes & Co. et al. eds., 1900). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). 
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Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,24 to alleviate the 
industry’s liquidity and interest rate risk difficulties.  The thrift industry 
was unable to make or purchase a sufficient volume of performing loans 
then newly authorized.  One third of the industry failed between 1986 and 
1995. 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 198925 created the Resolution Trust Corporation to liquidate and 
manage insolvent S&Ls, imposed new restrictions, abolished the 
supervisory authority of the Federal Home Loan Banks, and created a 
new, and short-lived, agency, called the Office of Thrift Supervision, to 
oversee the rapidly shrinking S&L industry.26  In response to market 
turmoil, commercial banks aggressively entered the residential mortgage 
loan market vacated by thrifts, thereby setting the stage for the next 
financial catastrophe.   
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”)27 eliminated 
restrictions on affiliations between commercial banks and investment 
banks, and between insurance firms and banks.  The absence of economic 
stress or systemic bank failure invariably prompts the industry to lobby 
for easing prior restrictions.   
Congress and the administration responded to the 2008 financial 
crisis with policy initiatives comparable to those which followed U.S. 
banking crises over the past century: (1) conduct hearings; (2) enact new 
restrictive laws that attempt to prevent similar abuses in the future; and 
(3) create new regulatory agencies or increase authority for existing 
agencies to promulgate rules and monitor institutional compliance with 
the law.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”)28 created the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and the Federal Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) among other entities, and expanded the powers of the Federal 
Reserve, the FDIC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), as well as required banks—especially those deemed 
systemically-important, or Too Big to Fail—to increase funding by equity 
 
 24. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 
1469 (1982). 
 25. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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capital, direct more attention to maintaining adequate levels of liquidity, 
and enhance risk management processes.   
Congress revised the Dodd-Frank Act in 2018 with passage of the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(“EGA”),29 which required banking regulators to tailor their prudential 
regulations issued in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to account 
for differences in risk and complexity among regulated banks.  
The United States has a long and undistinguished historical 
record of bank failure, market panic, and legislative response.  Well-
conceived public policy initiatives often result in unintended 
consequences leading to subsequent bank failures, which serve as a 
catalyst for new legislative and regulatory efforts. 
IV.  BANK FAILURE AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS 
Researchers long ago noted that bank failures coincide with 
adverse developments in the economy.  Freidman and Schwartz 
contend problems in the financial system worsen an economic 
contraction by reducing the wealth of bank shareholders and 
precipitating a rapid decline in the supply of money.30  Former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke extends their pioneering work by 
evaluating how debtor bankruptcies may further affect economic 
output and indicating that “[a]s the real costs of intermediation 
increase, some borrowers (especially households, farmers, and small 
firms) f[ind] credit to be expensive and difficult to obtain.  The effects 
of this credit squeeze on aggregate demand helped convert the severe 
downturn of 1929–1930 into a protracted depression.”31  Charles 
Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, among other academics, claim that 
bank failures are part of the business cycle and result from myopic 
foresight by bankers.32 
Liquidity issues tend to follow once a bank’s capital, asset 
quality, and earnings problems become well-known by regulatory 
 
 29. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGA”), Pub. 
L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
 30. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960 passim (1963) (arguing that changes in the 
money supply profoundly influenced the U.S. economy). 
 31. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of 
the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 257 (1983). 
 32. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 2–4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 5th ed. 2005). 
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supervisors, credit rating agencies, and the inter-bank market.  The 
press publishes adverse articles about the financial problems of a bank 
or the banking system.  Core and non-core depositors alike withdraw 
funds.  If a rapidly deteriorating bank has little high-quality collateral 
available for pledging at the central bank or correspondent banks, 
liquidity pressures deepen.  Weak banks lacking unencumbered, 
quality assets are unable to borrow funds in the inter-bank market 
even on a short-term basis.  Diamond and Dybvig believe the mission 
of the banking industry is conducive to precipitating banking panics 
since “[b]anks create liquidity risk for themselves as they provide 
liquidity to customers in the form of loan commitments and 
mismatched terms of longer-term assets funded by shorter term 
liabilities.”33 
Ultimately, a bank fails when management and the board of 
directors are unable to establish a viable business plan for qualified 
management to implement, and unwilling or incapable of identifying, 
measuring, monitoring, and controlling risks commensurate with a 
safe and sound institution.  Parsons cites the results of almost 100 
FDIC Material Loss Reviews that highlight issues leading to 
governmental losses incurred when banks are liquidated or merged. 
“Ineffective bank directors are identified as a primary cause of bank 
failure.”34  According to the FDIC, typical characteristics of the 489 
banks that failed between 2008 and 2013 included “heightened 
concentrations of [real estate acquisition, development, and 
construction (“ADC”)] lending, rapid asset growth, reliance on 
funding sources other than stable core deposits, and relatively lower 
capital-to-assets ratios.”35  The failing banks did not modify plans or 
heed warning signs indicative of imminent economic distress, and 
thus, the losses were predictable. 
 
 33. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POLITICAL ECON. 401, 401–419 (1983). 
 34. Richard J. Parsons, Banks Should Reject More Board Candidates, AM. BANKER (Oct. 
19, 2012, 1:44 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-should-reject-more-
board-candidates [https://perma.cc/7F6E-F2UU]. 
 35. MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, CHAIRMAN, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE: 
AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013, at xxv (2017), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KH3-
S4UN]. 
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V.  RECENT BANK LEGISLATION 
The earlier studies cited evaluated economic and financial 
issues applicable to bank failure more than fifty years ago.  Bank 
failure is related to economic contraction.  We updated these studies 
and also found economic growth or contraction, the condition of the 
financial markets, and bank failure as indicators of new banking 
legislation.  Table 1 provides statistics on the annual number of bank 
failures in the United States over a half-century between 1968 and 
2018.  On average, fifty-nine banks failed per year and annual bank 
failures ranged from zero during several years sampled to over 500 in 
the tumultuous year of 1989.  The two big waves of failure included 
the thrift crisis during the 1980s and early 1990s, and that associated 
with the housing finance debacle during the 2008 financial crisis.  Our 
focus is on promulgation of banking law and related regulation, rather 
than extensive econometric analysis of bank failure and the economy.  
We present four comprehensive economic and financial 
market indices.  As shown in Table 1, the annual civilian 
unemployment rate over the five decades sampled averaged 6.15%, 
and ranged between 10.8% in 1982 and 3.4% in 1968.  Real or 
inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (“GDP”) expanded at an 
average annual rate of 2.81%, and ranged between 7.2% in 1984 and 
-2.5% in 2009.  Ten-year U.S. Treasury notes averaged 6.34% per 
year, and ranged between 14.59% in 1982 and 1.88% in 2015.  By 
contrast, real or inflation-adjusted ten-year U.S. Treasury rates 
averaged 2.30%, and ranged between 10.79% in 1982 and -5.31% in 
1974.  The five decades depicted show high economic and market 
variability important to understanding the potential relationship to 
bank failure and resultant legislative action. 
 
 
Table 1 
Illustrative Economic and Market Indices and Bank Failure 
(1968 to 2018) 
Factor Average High Low 
U.S. Bank 
Failure 
59 531 0 
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Unemployment 
Rate 
6.15% 10.80% 3.40% 
% Change Real 
GDP 
2.81% 7.20% -2.50% 
10-year 
Treasury 
6.34% 14.59% 1.88% 
Real 10-year 
Treasury 
2.30% 10.79% -5.31% 
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (Department of Commerce), Department of Labor 
and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
We hypothesize that bank failures should increase during and 
after periods of high unemployment, low or contracting GDP, and 
high interest rates expressed on either a nominal or real basis.  We 
employ statistical correlation analysis to study the influence between 
the economy, financial markets, and bank failure.  Correlation 
analysis provides a measure of the relative—not absolute—
relationship between variables and does not suggest causality or 
economic consequence.  Table 2 illustrates the coincident bank failure 
correlation data that can range from +1.00 (i.e., perfect positive 
correlation) to –1.00 (i.e., perfect inverse correlation).  
As shown, bank failure correlates positively with the 
unemployment rate at the 10% confidence level, and nominal and real 
interest rates at the 5% confidence level with a one-tail or directional 
(i.e., positive or negative) test.  The confidence level represents the 
probability that a relationship exists when otherwise untrue.  As more 
Americans seeking employment are unable to find meaningful full-
time work, they lack the financial ability, cash flow, and liquidity to 
repay mortgage, credit card, and consumer loan debt.  Bank loan 
originations decline, loan losses increase, profits decay, capital 
evaporates, and failures surge.  Similarly, when nominal or real 
interest rates increase, consumers and businesses alike find it more 
expensive to repay loans—and bank failures rise.  Although GDP 
correlates with bank failures in a negative manner as projected (i.e., 
quicker economic growth should lead to fewer bank failures), the 
result is not statistically significant.  The above statistical 
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relationships remain when failures are lagged by one year.  Other 
political factors, such as the election of a new President, the party 
affiliation of the President, and whether the political composition of 
Congress is unified or divided, proved insignificant to the passage of 
banking laws and therefore are not illustrated in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Correlation of Bank Failure, Legislation and Economic & 
Financial Indices (1968-2018) 
Factor Bank Failure Bank Law 
U.S. Bank Failure N/A 33.3%* 
Unemployment Rate 20.0%*** 18.2%*** 
% Change Real GDP -4.4% -27.0%** 
10-year Treasury 25.2%** 1.8% 
Real 10-year Treasury 28.9%** 9.7% 
Statistical Significance: * at 1%, ** at 5%, and *** at 10% 
 
There have been approximately twenty major pieces of 
banking legislation enacted in the United States (as listed in the 
Appendix) during the last half-century.  The passage of new 
legislation coincides very strongly with the condition of the banking 
industry and the economy.  The correlation between those years in 
which a new banking law was passed (shown as a dummy variable, 
one, and otherwise, zero) and bank failure is positive, and significant 
at the 1% level, as shown in Table 2.  Congress responds to periods 
of increasing bank failure and related escalating liquidation costs 
borne by the public by introducing new programs, rules, and agencies 
to reduce the potential repetition of failure in the future.  Although 
economic expansion and contraction within GDP showed no 
significance explaining bank failure, the relationship is negative and 
significant at the 5% level when correlated with the passage of a new 
bank law.  Similarly, the unemployment rate correlates positively with 
the enactment of new law and is significant at the 10% confidence 
level.  
Repeated legislative efforts to respond to prior crises by 
introducing a central bank and lender of last resort, providing modest 
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deposit insurance coverage, and requiring more stringent regulatory 
rules applicable to capital, liquidity, and risk management have not 
been sufficient despite expectations to the contrary.  Bankers and 
regulators appear reluctant to acknowledge the expensive lessons 
from prior episodes of failure.  As cited above, such failure has been 
attributed to the unwillingness or inability of management and the 
board to measure, monitor, and control risks compatible with a viable, 
safe, and sound institution, or implement business plans that promote 
long-term survival.  
Recent regulatory and governance efforts to promote board 
diversity and require refreshment strategies have produced mixed 
results.  For example, Baum notes that “[t]he empirical support for 
staffing boards with independent directors, however, remains 
surprisingly shaky given the ubiquitous reliance on independent 
directors.  The [2008] financial crisis has added further doubts.”36  
Similar evidence contradicts “good” governance claims applicable to 
board diversification.37  Pathan and Faff conducted a longitudinal study 
of large U.S. bank holding companies prior to and after the rules of 
Sarbanes-Oxley were introduced and focused on the composition of 
boards.38  They found that “[a]lthough gender diversity improves bank 
performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002), 
the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–
2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011).”39  Further, Essen et al. found 
that prior governance recommendations have not allowed banks to 
prosper or avoid failure during crises. “Good governance 
prescriptions, such as board independence, incentive compensation 
and the separation of the CEO and board chair, have on the whole 
proved harmful to firm performance in times of crisis.”40  The 
research mentioned above indicates that efforts to enhance 
 
 36. Harald Baum, The Rise of the Independent Director: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective 1–34 (Jul. 30, 2016) (unpublished paper), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814978&download=yes 
[https://perma.cc/9AB4-LHES]. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Shams Pathan & Robert Faff, Does Board Structure in Banks Really Affect Their 
Performance?, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1573, 1573–89 (2013). 
 39. Id. at 1573. 
 40. Marc van Essen, Peter-Jan Engelen & Michael Carney, Does “Good” Corporate 
Governance Help in a Crisis?  The Impact of Country- and Firm-Level Governance 
Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE 201, 201 (2012). 
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governance have not provided an additional safeguard to augment law 
and regulation. 
Congress responds to periods of economic distress, related surges 
in bank failure, and ballooning fiscal costs to bailout the financial sector 
by introducing legislative safeguards.  New regulatory agencies are 
created that precipitate additional reasons financial institutions are 
supervised.  Existing or newly-created banking agencies promulgate 
regulation among other sources of guidance for the financial sector. 
VI.  RECENT BANK REGULATION 
While banking law is critical to the development of plans and 
policies by insured financial institutions, accompanying regulation is 
more influential.  In most circumstances, federal legislation  is not self-
effectuating.  Market participants wait until the issuance of 
accompanying regulations, which outline the true extent of compliance 
obligations before conforming their business operations to the new legal 
requirements.  In many cases, these regulations are not issued until well 
after the statute’s effective date.  This leaves business and market 
operations to continue largely unchanged until the regulations are issued 
and fully effective.  It is the issuance of the accompanying regulations, 
rather than passage of the legislation, that has a substantial impact on 
financial operations of banks. 
In the case of the Dodd-Frank Act, which substantially 
overhauled regulation of prudential financial regulation, consumer 
financial protection, and the derivatives and mortgage markets—among 
other changes—the total number of separate rulemaking requirements 
was 390.41  These regulations were not issued for many years after 
passage of the Act, and in some cases, the regulations are still not yet in 
full effect.  For example, as of July 19, 2016, only 274 of 390 total 
rulemaking requirements (or 70%) had been finalized—six years after the 
Act’s enactment.42  This regulatory overhang happens frequently and 
results in the impact from new banking laws being felt many years after 
their enactment.   
 
 41. See Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (July 19, 2016), 
www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank-rulemaking-progress-report [https://perma.cc/ZX78-9757]. 
 42. Id. 
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Many U.S. Presidents have issued executive orders to ensure 
regulatory benefits exceed costs.43  President Carter (Executive Order 
12044) required procedures for analyzing the impact of new regulations 
and attempted to minimize their adverse impact in 1980.44  During the 
same year, Congress passed, and President Carter signed, a law that 
created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) to 
review and approve all new reporting requirements.45  President Reagan 
(Executive Order 12291) provided OIRA with further responsibility to 
ensure regulatory benefits exceed costs in 1982.46  By enacting Executive 
Order 12866 President Clinton retained OIRA’s review of new regulatory 
burdens and reinforced the viewpoint that regulation should maximize 
net benefits to society.47  Most recently, President Trump issued 
Executive Orders 13891 and 13892 to improve agency guidance and 
enforcement.48   
These executive orders are not applicable to independent 
agencies, such as the federal banking regulators, but set important 
precedent that may be followed by independent agencies in certain cases.  
For example, independent agencies may choose to voluntarily adopt the 
precepts that agency guidance should not form the basis for determining 
violations of law, and that significant guidance should be issued through 
public notice and comment with approval from high-ranking agency 
officials.  The executive orders are also consistent with recent 
Interagency Statement.49  Nevertheless, the volume of regulation and 
regulatory guidance has continued to be issued at a rapid pace, 
significantly impacting operations of financial institutions as many 
researchers have analyzed.   
We evaluate the trend in the number and type of regulatory 
pronouncements in the United States over the past twenty-five years.  We 
 
 43. Susan Dudley, A Brief History of Regulation and Deregulation, REG. REV. (Mar. 11, 
2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/11/dudley-brief-history-regulation-
deregulation/ [https://perma.cc/RXF9-TFL6]. 
 44. See Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (Mar. 23, 1978). 
 45. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980); accord 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as 
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2018)). 
 46. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 47. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 48. See Exec. Order No. 13891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9, 2019); Exec. Order No. 
13892, 84 Fed. Reg. 55239 (Oct. 9, 2019). 
 49. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 18-5/ CA 18-7, INTERAGENCY 
STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 12, 2018). 
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focus on law and regulation of the banking sector rather than thrift 
institutions.  The majority of regulations released in the 1980s and early 
1990s emphasized the problems and failure of the savings and loan 
industry leading to the creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, and 
the merger of the beleaguered and woefully inadequate Savings 
Association Insurance Fund with the Bank Insurance Fund.  Savings and 
loans are no longer an important component of the banking industry.  
According to the FDIC, banks account for 87.3% of the 5256 financial 
institutions and 93.7% of the $18.5 trillion of assets as of September 30, 
2019.50  Thrift industry analysis represents a historical perspective while 
the banking sector is forward-looking.  In addition, the FDIC began 
electronic publication of regulations in 1995.51  Accordingly, we review 
the trend and type of regulation over twenty-five years between 1995 and 
2018.  Many regulatory releases of the FDIC (insured banks and state-
chartered, non-member banks) are also simultaneously promulgated by 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (national- or federal-
chartered banks), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (state-chartered member banks and holding companies).  
The FDIC released over 350 regulations during the quarter-
century period studied, averaging 14.75 regulations per year.  As shown 
in Table 3, the numbers of regulatory pronouncements ranged between 
thirty in 2009, to five in 2003.  The correlation with economic conditions, 
bank failure, and political affiliation of the President and Congress is 
presented in Table 4.  The correlation between the passage of time (1995 
is one and 2018 is twenty-four) and regulation is negative, and not 
significant.  Similarly, there is a modest—but insignificant—positive 
correlation between the enactment of new banking law and the release of 
regulation.  The insignificance is unsurprising given the time taken by 
agencies to respond to a new law and craft guidance for the industry.  
However, the number of new regulations does correlate positively with 
the number of annual bank failures; the correlation is significant at the 
10% confidence level. 
 
 50. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2019, 13 FDIC 
QUARTERLY 1, 5–11, tbls.I-A, II-A, III-A, IV-A & V-A (2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2019-vol13-1/fdic-v13n1-4q2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HS9G-53RW]. 
 51. See, e.g., Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-
bin/ECFR?page=browse [https://perma.cc/8NY9-VSRF] (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) 
(providing electronic access to FDIC, and other agencies) regulations); Federal Register: The 
Daily Journal of the United States Government, https://www.federalregister.gov 
[https://perma.cc/TY4M-HHGF] (last visited Dec. 20, 2019). 
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Table 3 
Regulation by FDIC (1995 to 2018) 
Factor Average High Low 
Regulation 14.75 30 5 
Safety & 
Soundness 
4.13 16 0 
Administrative 6.04 18 1 
Compliance 4.58 13 1 
Source: Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 
https://gov.ecfr.io. 
 
Regulatory supervisors invariably face more hostile legislators in 
committee hearings as the public loses confidence in the banking sector 
and costs to bailout failed institutions escalate.  Regulatory guidance is 
positively correlated with a Democratic-controlled Congress and a 
President from the same party.  As subsequently established, safety and 
soundness rules respond to deteriorating conditions within the economy, 
an increasing number of bank failures and political affiliation of the 
president and Congress.  Compliance regulatory guidance correlates with 
the passage of bank law and with inflation and nominal interest rates.  
Select prior laws require adjustment of stated thresholds with changes in 
price.  Administrative guidance retains no obvious relationship to 
economic, industry or political factors. 
Table 4 
Correlation between Regulation, the Economy and Political 
Factors (1995 to 2018) 
Factor Regulation Safety & 
Soundness 
Administrative Compliance 
Time -11.1% 21.7% -7.5% -43.0% 
New Bank Law 13.6% -4.9% 5.6% 28.9%*** 
Bank Failure 28.8%*** 58.1%* -13.1% 4.9% 
Unemployment 
Rate 
31.8%*** 58.9%* -5.4% 0.5% 
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% Change Real 
GDP 
-35.5%** -54.3%* -15.2% 12.5% 
Inflation 5.5% -24.5% 1.2% 42.4%** 
10-year Treasury 7.3% -24.9% 5.5% 41.2%** 
Real 10-year 
Treasury 
4.3% -11.0% 5.1% 17.1% 
New President 9.2% 15.1% -10.1% 13.8% 
Democratic 
President 
34.2%** 39.9%** 20.5% -3.3% 
Democratic 
Congress 
50.2%* 64.9%* 16.1% 4.9% 
Statistical Significance: * at 1%, ** at 5% and *** at 10% 
 
We categorize regulation into three types: (1) safety and 
soundness; (2) administrative; and (3) compliance.  The categorization of 
rules into one of these three groups must be viewed as approximate; other 
legal scholars or banking experts could reasonably change the placement 
of several regulations. 
A. Safety and Soundness 
Approximately 28% of the regulatory releases reflect safety and 
soundness and the number of safety and soundness regulations ranged 
from zero for several years to sixteen in 2009 as the housing market 
crashed and bank failures surged.  While the number of such 
pronouncements has increased with time as reflected by a positive 
correlation, the relationship is not statistically significant.   
By contrast, the release of new regulations designed to enhance 
bank safety correlates very positively with the number of bank failures in 
a given year, which is significant at the 1% level.  And, regulatory rules 
correlate highly with the economy.  New guidance related to operating 
safely correlates positively with the unemployment rate and negatively 
with real GDP.  Both economic metrics are significant at the 1% level.  
Bankers can expect more regulatory guidance affecting the balance sheet 
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and the income statement when the unemployment rate increases and the 
economy contracts.  
Political factors likewise affect the release of new guidance.  
While safety and soundness rules increase just after the election of a new 
President, given a positive correlation, the relationship is not sufficient to 
be considered significant.  The party affiliation of the President and 
Congress are important to operating safely.  However, it is not obvious 
that a Democratic or Republican President or Congress should be more 
or less likely to champion new banking regulation.  Given the absence of 
an a priori relationship, we apply a two-tail or non-directional statistical 
test.  The correlation between the release of new regulations and a 
President from the Democratic party is positive and significant at the 5% 
level and very positive with a Democratic-controlled Congress 
significant at the 1% level.  Party affiliation is important and elections 
must be monitored closely by bankers to assess likely future asset/liability 
directions.  It is important to note that the correlation between political 
party and issuance of safety rules applies only to a sample period of the 
recent quarter-century.  Such past relationships may change in the future.  
B. Administrative 
Approximately 41% of the regulations promulgated by the FDIC 
over the twenty-five-year period examined focus on administrative rules.  
Administrative rules show no significance to economic or political 
factors.  The lack of correlation should not be interpreted to suggest such 
rules are not costly to implement and can impact efficiency ratios 
important to management and investors. 
C. Compliance 
The remaining compliance category accounts for 31% of new 
regulatory pronouncements by the FDIC.  Passage of a new banking law 
correlates positively with promulgation of new compliance directives, 
which is significant at the 10% level.  Similar to administrative 
regulation, there is no discernable trend of compliance rules related to 
political factors or bank failure.  Compliance rules do correlate positively 
with inflation (and interest rates that partially reflect projected inflation) 
given historically enacted laws that require regulators to adjust thresholds 
with changes in prices.  Inflation and ten-year interest rates on U.S. 
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Treasury notes are significant at the 5% level of confidence.  In addition, 
the correlation between time and compliance rules is negatively related, 
not positive as projected, and thereby insignificant. 
Bank failures prompt the promulgation of new banking 
legislation and subsequent regulations, especially those reflecting safety 
and soundness, structured to remediate the causes of liquidation and 
related costs to maintain confidence in the financial system.  Safety and 
soundness guidance is especially sensitive to the economy given the 
relationship to bank failures and the political affiliation of the President 
and Congress.  
Regulations ultimately respond to prior law enacted by Congress.  
Some laws precipitate more guidance for the industry, or persist over a 
long period of time with later modifications or revisions.  Even though 
the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted only ten years ago, it has prompted the 
most supervisory attention and direction when compared to other pieces 
of legislation during the twenty-five-year period examined. We 
categorize the major issues and/or laws that precipitated the release of 
banking regulation below:  
 
• Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 201052: 15.8% 
• Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 199453 and Riegel-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
199454: 7.6% 
• Community Reinvestment Act of 197755: 5.4% 
• Securities Act of 193356 and Securities Exchange Act 
of 193457: 3.4% 
• Basel Compliance: 3.4% 
• Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: 2.8% 
• Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 199958: 2.3% 
 
 52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2018). 
 53. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
325, 108 Stat. 2160 (2018). 
 54. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 
108 Stat. 2338 (2018). 
 55. Community Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (2018). 
 56. Securities Act, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (2018). 
 57. Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (2018). 
 58. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (2018). 
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• Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act59: 2.3% 
• Accounting: 0.9% 
 
Not all regulations have the same financial impact on the 
industry.  Other research previously cited attempts to recognize the costs 
of complying with regulation.  Our effort is more modest and has assessed 
why and when banking laws are enacted and subsequent regulations are 
disseminated.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article reviews key banking laws enacted in the United 
States during the past half-century with a focus on resulting regulatory 
trends over the previous twenty-five years.  We have addressed a number 
of related questions.  How has banking legislation, supervision and 
regulation evolved, and what external factors, if any, precipitate change?  
Bankers can anticipate they will need to respond to more banking-related 
laws as the economy contracts and bank failures surge.  Once enacted, 
existing or newly-created regulatory bodies will be more likely to issue 
guidance.   
Do evolving regulations primarily reflect safety and soundness, 
compliance, or administrative matters?  Administrative rules are more 
common than compliance or safety and soundness rules, but exhibit little 
association with the economy, the financial sector, or political factors.  
Compliance regulatory guidance increases during periods of rapidly 
rising prices and enactment of new law.  Regulators are more likely to 
release new safety and soundness guidance under an adverse economy 
and deteriorating banking sector.  Regulators also disseminate more 
safety and soundness rules under a Democratic President or Congress.  
There is no evidence regulatory activity has increased over the past 
quarter century evaluated.  However, we have conclusively determined 
that economic, market, and political trends cannot be ignored when 
analyzing the enactment of bank-related laws and notice of resulting 
regulation.   
  
 
 59. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGA”), Pub. 
L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
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APPENDIX: KEY BANKING LAWS (1968 TO 2018) 
• International Banking Act of 1978 
• Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate 
Risk Control Act of 1978 
• Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 
• Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 
• Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 
• Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 
• Crime Control Act of 1990 
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991 
• Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 
• Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994 
• Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994 
• Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1996 
• Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
• International Money Laundering Abatement and 
Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
• Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 
• Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 
• The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
• Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
• Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 
• Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 
 
